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This Editorial highlights a unique focus of this theme issue on the biological
perspectives in deriving psychological taxonomies coming from neurochem-
istry, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, genetics, psychiatry, developmental
and comparative psychology—as contrasted to more common discussions
of socio-cultural concepts (personality) and methods (lexical approach).
It points out the importance of the distinction between temperament and
personality for studies in human and animal differential psychophysiology,
psychiatry and psycho-pharmacology, sport and animal practices during the
past century. It also highlights the inability of common statistical methods to
handle nonlinear, feedback, contingent, dynamical and multi-level relation-
ships between psychophysiological systems of consistent psychological traits
discussed in this theme issue.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Diverse perspectives on diversity:
multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences’.1. Focusing on biologically-based traits: temperament versus
personality
The topic of this theme issue is one of the oldest and most fundamental pro-
blems of psychology: the classification of biologically-based traits1 in healthy
people and their extreme expressions in cases of mental illness. We all know
how family upbringing, culture, personal history and socio-economic status
(SES) can contribute to individual differences in values, attitudes, manners,
skills and habits that manifest as consistent patterns in human behaviour.
Yet, at some point all of us start wondering why children in the same family
appear to be different from a very early age on, although they have the same
parents, teachers, SES and culture (i.e. the same social environment). We
often observe that there is something in people that remains rather stably
over time, nomatter howmuch training or education is applied. This ‘something’
must come from biological factors.
The oldest theory about types and the biological factors underlying human
psychological diversity emerged in a biology-rooted science—medicine—about
2500 years ago. The Greek physician Hippocrates (460–375 BC), often credited
as the father of modern medicine, categorized four types of consistent behav-
ioural patterns that resemble descriptors used in modern psychology and
psychiatry: impulsive–agitated (choleric), depressed (melancholic), socially
detached (phlegmatic) and manic–extraverted (sanguine). Hippocrates (and
later Galen, AD 127–132) called these characters temperamentums (Latin for
‘mixtures’) because they suspected that differences in ratios of mixtures of
vital bodily fluids (i.e. chemical imbalances) made people consistently different.
Two and a half millennia later, neurochemistry, psychiatry and psycho-
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Figure 1. Differential psychology studies a number of consistent individual differences based on socio-cultural (yellow area) and biological factors (green area). The
fact that biological characteristics interact with socio-cultural ones and emerge as components of personality does not devalue the need for biological sciences to
study them independently of cultural factors (as, for example, in the case of age and sex). Social perception of individuals (i.e. how people see other people,
depicted here as a magnifying glass), as represented by the Five Factor Model (FFM), highlights only some components of personality (spotlights) and downplays
many others (labelled here ‘in the shadow’) as listed in the right column of the figure. The resulting list of personality traits is therefore biased toward individual
differences prioritized by societies. This list might not be suitable for taxonomies of biologically-based traits related to dynamics in behavioural regulation
(temperament) even though it might adequately represent a socio-cultural structure of interpersonal perception.
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influence the variability in behavioural regulation.
Thus, the concept of temperament refers to neurochemi-
cally based individual differences in the regulation of
formal dynamical aspects of behaviour. These differences
were studied for over 100 years in developmental, clinical,
sport and organizational psychology, in psychiatry and, as
noted by Rusalov [1], in human and animal differential psy-
chophysiology. This concept was especially useful in the
practice of breeding domestic and sport animals (such as
dogs, cats and horses) as well as experimental animals for
neurochemical and psychopharmacological research, and in
research on the impact of stress on farm and sport animals.
These differences included the traits that were linked to
well-identified neurochemical systems—endurance, impul-
sivity, mobility, stress reactivity, degree of vocalization,
speed of motion, learning capacities (trainability), attentive-
ness, etc. Since personality theorists expanded their research
activities over the past 20 years also to include biologically-
based differences, these two concepts became inevitably
intertwined. Many studies reported in this theme issueused the term ‘personality’ for biologically-based individual
differences, which we also define here as temperamental
traits. Let us briefly mention several distinct features
that differentiate these concepts of ‘temperament’ and
‘personality’.
First, in line with its original concept, temperament is
defined here as neurochemically-based individual differen-
ces in behavioural regulation, noted both in pre-cultural
individuals (animals, infants) and adult humans, whereas
personality is a concept describing individual differences pri-
marily from the socio-cultural perspective specific to humans
(figure 1). Many studies into biologically-based individual
differences in humans were dictated by the demands for
selecting athletes, cosmonauts and top managers, when a
candidate’s endurance, speed of reaction, impulse control,
plasticity for sudden changes in situations and emotional
stability were more important for selection than their social
experience or attitudes. Studies of the neurophysiological sys-
tems underlying these traits have been conducted on animals,
in particular, rats, mice, dogs, cats and nonhuman primates,
for over a century [1–5], continuing in contemporary
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behaviour and processing of social cues [8–10], attention-
related and learning traits [11–13], orientation biases [7,14,15]
and especially emotional regulation [6–10,14,16–18]. Behav-
ioural orientation traits, such as sensation seeking, empathy
and probabilistic processing, are also present in pre-cultural
individuals. As pointed out by Blair [8], mirror neurons
linked to empathy were initially found in nonhuman primates,
and individual differences in empathy were shown to occur in
many other species a well. Hasselmo & Stern [11] describe a
mathematical model of the neurophysiology underlying rule
learning, which is part of causal thinking and probabilistic pro-
cessing. Consistent individual differences in rule learning,
occurring already in infants, are often described as genetically
and biologically-based intellectual abilities in both animals
and humans [3]. In short, the traits differentiating between
individuals that belong to the same species—physical endur-
ance, speed of actions, sociability, impulsivity, compulsivity,
plasticity, emotionality, probabilistic processing, sensation
seeking and empathy—are temperament traits having a well-
documented biological basis. Some of these traits are also
incorporated in structural models of personality but with a
socio-cultural perspective.
Second, temperament traits are conceived as individual
differences in consistent formal–dynamical aspects of behav-
ioural regulation that show up universally across situations
and contexts (endurance, speed of behavioural integration,
reactivity, sensitivity to specific reinforcers, emotionality).
Many non-temperamental traits conceived as personality,
by contrast, are classically considered as comprising the
content characteristics shaped by socio-cultural appraisal
and interpretation (such as values, particular attitudes,
habits and preferences, autobiographical history, self-image,
cultural, religious and national identity) [3,4,14,17,19–24].
Third, the most commonly discussed feature of tempera-
mental traits is their relative stability over the life course (if
controlled for age-related changes). Personality aspects, on
the other hand, such as our systems of values and attitudes,
andvarious aspects of personal identity, often change after dra-
matic life events. For example, Kagan [14,21,25], one of the
pioneers of longitudinal research in temperament, uncovered
in his research a relative stability for the temperament trait
Neuroticism. This construct, adopted by the Five Factor
Model of personality (FFM) as a personality trait, was shown
to be biologically based and even having identifiable herit-
ability, confirming that Neuroticism can be conceived as a
component of temperament. The impressive works of Netter
[7] and Jones & Sloan [9] provided a unique focus on the role
of not only monoamines but also hormones, such as cortisol
and oxytocin, as contributing factors in temperament traits
related to emotional and behavioural reactivity. In line with
the findings of Kagan and colleagues using MRI techniques
and behavioural observations, Jones & Sloan [9] concluded
that ‘foetal and infant development may be the pivotal period
for the neocortex to experience and utilize oxytocin as the
developmental plasticity’.
Fourth, an important and rather novel criterion separat-
ing temperament from personality relating to morality was
described by Saucier [5]. Modern personality models describe
components of individual differences that are favoured by
societies and associated with morality, such as the FFM fac-
tors of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness. By contrast,
temperament traits of animals and human infants exhibitconsistent variations regardless of moral judgement and
teachings about morality.2. Blending concepts referring to biological and
socio-cultural aspects of individual differences
might be not harmless
Over 40 taxonomic models of temperament and personality
have been offered in differential psychology and psychiatry
since the birth of these sciences 100 years ago (see [3] for
review). We still know very little, however, about the basic
neural systems underlying the traits that have been proven
to have a biological and neurochemical basis, and a consen-
sus on the list or categorization of these traits has not yet
been achieved. One of the challenges slowing progress in
the development of taxonomies of temperament and mental
disorders is that individual differences in behavioural regu-
lation lie at the crossroads of multiple social and biological
factors. All of these factors are strongly entangled. Therefore,
special care and a well-developed conceptual framework are
needed in their disentanglement for our analytic purposes,
which would ensure the accuracy of measurements and the
validity of their interpretations for taxonomy development.
A valid scientific approach requires exchange among
different disciplines and different perspectives concerning
the partitioning of individual differences, respecting dif-
ferences in terminology, conceptualization and methods. In
contemporary personality psychology, social–cultural con-
cepts are mixed with traditional concepts of temperament.
This blending has led to at least three unfortunate trends:
mixing, missing and misusing scientific concepts.
(a) Mixing concepts
Themodelmost publicized in personality psychology, the FFM
of human personality [5,26–36], capitalizes on the stability and
biological correlates of two dimensions that are well-known
from temperament research (Emotionality and Arousal
level), labelled in the FFM as Neuroticism and Extraversion.
FFM proponents defend the blending of temperament and
personality concepts in their model by referring to the inter-
action of biologically-based aspects of individual differences
with socio-cultural factors (e.g. education, religion, culture,
language, family environment) that contribute to an individ-
ual’s personality. However, an interaction between factors is
not an excuse for not differentiating between concepts describ-
ing them. For example, sex, age and possible propensities for
mental illness, which are also based on neurochemical and
neurophysiological systems, interact with socio-cultural factors
as well, and so they also contribute to an individual’s per-
sonality (figure 1). There are sex differences in rates of
employment and rule obedience [37]. The interaction between
sex and ‘personality traits’ is also coupled with age: there are
suggestions of a ‘middle age–middle sex’ effect in verbal and
physical abilities, levelling sex differences in these character-
istics after the peak of the reproductive period [38]. If we do
not blend sex, age and mental illness with personality and
instead keep them as independent variables in our studies,
then we probably should not do so for neurochemically-
based differences, thus temperament, either (figure 1).
Personality psychology uses the factor analysis (FA) of
verbal descriptors of human characteristics of mixed origins
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correlations among these mixtures of characteristics and this
results in mongrel factors which, by default, would not show
a valid differentiation between biological systems because the
resulting dimensions will be contaminated by pro-social
biases of language [3,5,16,26–36,39–45]. Models derived from
human language therefore cannot constitute models of biologi-
cally-based traits as FFM proponents often claim. Instead, they
likely represent dimensions of socio-cultural perception and
appraisal, as noted by many authors [3,5,16,26–36,39–41,46].
History has already seen tragic examples of outcomes
arising from the insufficient differentiation between
socio-cultural and biological factors influencing individual
differences. This occurred in the field of intelligence testing,
particularly during the massive IQ testing between 1950 and
1980, when scientists claimed that those testing methods
allow biological intellectual abilities or learning disabilities to
be diagnosed, yet without controlling for socio-cultural factors,
such as parental level of education, cultural differences,
language barriers, SES, etc. As the result, thousands of low-
income people or people from non-English-speaking cultures
were labelled with a low IQ-score and lost their chances
for employment or higher education. A similar controversy
occurred around the employment of women in science based
on assumptions that women have inferior intellectual abilities
compared to men. These examples illustrate the importance of
conceptual separations of social and biological factors contri-
buting to individual differences, even though these factors
obviously interact. Otherwise, it might not be harmless to
ignore technical concepts such as those used to identify specific
temperament traits (figure 1), and to use only concepts in
which biologically and socially-based individual differences
are blended, such as personality.(b) Missing concepts
The FFM was initially developed by incorporating concepts
studied in temperament research and other fields (Neuroti-
cism, Extraversion, Openness to experience). It also used two
further concepts (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) from
the Big Five model of social perception, which was derived
from human everyday language using lexical approaches
[26,36]. That is, these two models were not developed on the
basis of experimental biological methods [26,40,41].
The socio-cultural partitioning of individual differences as
reflected in human language, however, is influenced by
various pro-social biases that emphasize some individual
differences, level others, and also put evaluative moral judge-
ments on many of them [46]. In our theme issue, Saucier [5]
points out the contribution of morality to personality traits,
and Uher [26,45] and Trofimova [16] point to the redundancy
of the FFM, the Big Five Model and other factor-analytic
models derived with using merely language-based methods.
More specifically, human societies universally highlight indi-
vidual characteristics that improve functioning of a society as
a system but downplay characteristics unrelated to social
exchanges that are, however, important for individual’s func-
tioning. As a result, social perception is focused on persons’
abilities to communicate information (FFM’s dimension of
Extraversion), to be emotionally stable (Neuroticism), to obey
social order and maintain peace (Conscientiousness and
Agreeableness), and to learn and deliver knowledge (Open-
ness to experience). Societies give grades and awards topeople for socially accepted behaviours and develop other
public identifiers of these abilities. Yet, Western societies
promote equality between people of different sex, age, blood
type, visual capacities, constitution, etc. even though the
gender of a person is still a valid subject for psychophysiologi-
cal studies and is often good-to-know for activities like dating
and family planning. Constitution is often important for jobs
that depend on certain constitutional types and is also the
subject of studies concerning the endocrinology of individual
differences. Age is often important to diagnose medical con-
ditions, including psychiatric problems. Several temperament
(neurochemically based) traits that are important for individ-
uals’ functioning may be less noticed by society (figure 1)
even though, as shown in this theme issue, they have well-
documented biological bases: plasticity and impulsivity
[1–3,6,23,25,41], sensation seeking [10,25], speed of speech
and physical actions [1,7,16,24], sustained attention or effortful
control [12], sensory sensitivity [15], psychopathyand empathy
[3,8], a system of positive emotionality and security [16,18],
physical endurance [1,3,23], which, in its weakness, shows
up as a main symptom of depressive dispositions [39,47].(c) Misusing concepts
This theme issue reports on several studies on biological corre-
lates of individual differences as measured by common
personality tests [10,25,48]. The use of personality question-
naires mixing social and biological factors for biological
investigations of traits may lead to results that are not very con-
sistent [42–45,48,49], and we have to appreciate the practical
consequence of theoretical blending of concepts, as described
above. Investigating healthy human subjects with drug
challenges [7], hormonal monitoring [9], PET scans and appli-
cation of chemical agents to determine receptor densities of
specific neurotransmitters [10], as well with MRI and EEG
equipment [1,8,12,13,25] and behavioural tasks [1,7,12] is not
only expensive but also challenging in terms of recruitment of
volunteers and research ethics. That is why studies such as
those reported here, especially by Netter [7], and Farde et al.
[10] are so valuable. It is therefore important that we do not
squander these resources on explorations of constructs derived
from human language but instead use objective methods based
on experimental psychology or well-validated questionnaires
developed on the basis of findings frombiology-rooted sciences
such as differential psychophysiology [1,4,9,12,14,15,23–25],
psychiatry [8,14,18,39,50] or neurochemistry [3,16,23,24,39,46].
For example, Sallis et al. [48] noted that, in genetic studies,
the strongest association of genotypes was found not with
specific traits but with years of schooling (i.e. a composite
social variable). Yet, when the choice of measurement varia-
bles was rooted in well-documented links between specific
neurophysiological systems and specific psychological and be-
havioural individual differences (see, for example, [1,12]), then
more consistent associationswere found, such as indispositions
for depression or effortful control [12,13,22]. Effortful control is
conceived also as a frontal-lobe based ‘processing block’
(Pribram & Luria [51]), intellectual ergonicity (Rusalov [1,23]),
mental endurance (Trofimova [3,23]) ormore commonly as sus-
tained attention (Hasselmo & Stern [11]). Posner & Rothbart
[12] and Hoyniak and colleagues [13] reported links between
EEG and MRI measures and effortful control capacities in chil-
dren, and their life outcomes 30 years later. These links might
explain the findings of associations between genotypes and
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by learning abilities, self-organization, planning and impulse
control, functions classically linked to activity of the frontal
cortex. Also, as pointed by Sallis et al. [48], associations were
also found between depressive dispositions and genotypes.
This coincides with presentation of main symptoms of
depression as clinical variations in temperament traits of
physical endurance (symptom of fatigue), physical tempo
(i.e. motor retardation), sociability (social withdrawal), plas-
ticity (apathy for new tasks), sustained attention (inability
to focus), impulsivity, confidence (low self-image) and
neuroticism (increasing worries) [39,47]. Well-documented
associations of these symptoms and traits with actions of
specific neurotransmitters, neuropeptides and hormones
[3,7,9,10,16,24,39,47] are reported in the extensive field of
psycho-pharmacology; genetic associations and links to the
dopaminergic systems are also commonly found in schizo-
phrenia research [48,52]. All this highlights the importance of
attention to functionality of neurotransmitters in classifications
of human behaviour. Interestingly, none of the factor-analyti-
cally derived personality models identified many of these
traits, depressive or psychotic dispositions [36]. Structuring
neurophysiological, genetic and longitudinal studies in line
with neurochemical models of temperament might bring,
therefore, more consistent and indicative results.
Unlike many works analysing individual differences at
the socio-cultural level of integration (personality), this
theme issue gives voice to leading experts investigating the
biological level of integration of these differences: neurochem-
istry [2,6,7,9–11,16], neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
[1,8,12,13,15,25], genetics [48,52], psychiatry [8,39] and
comparative psychology [2,5,26].3. Choice of evidence: statistical–psychometric
versus conceptual–multi-disciplinary
All scientists studying biologically-based traits appreciate the
gravity of the task and look for evidence to support or dis-
prove the classifications proposed. There are, however, five
faulty trends in the search for such evidence that are
especially common in mainstream psychology:
1. Evidence of psychometric properties of tests is mistakenly con-
sidered as evidence of the structure of the actual phenomena under
study. In differential psychology, there is awidespreadmiscon-
ception, historically derived from psychometrics, that the best
way to discover and verify taxonomies of individual differ-
ences would be by using FA. Confirmatory FA and other
types of FA are commonly used by psychometricians
to ensure that the test scales independently represent the
psychological features they purport to measure. Verifying
psychometric test properties, however, does not move us any
closer to understanding the nature and/or structure of the indi-
vidual differences measured [26]. By analogy, a weighing scale
should reliably measure weight, but this does not constitute a
theory of gravitation in itself. The methods that technicians
use to tune their equipment differ from the methods theo-
reticians use to verify the proposed principles of natural
phenomena. Technicians may measure millions of weights,
but it is theoreticians who have helped us to understand that
weight is a consequence of gravity and not fundamental in
itself. No matter how many psychometric reports describ-
ing factor-analytical structures of specific questionnairesexist, they can only be used to explore the structure of these
questionnaires but do not provide any biological evidence [26].
Many researchers are concerned about the psychometric
independence of test scales, notably the belief that insufficient
independence may be the main reason for inconsistent results
[26,28–36,40,41,45,49,53,54]. Independence of scales, however,
is a property that psychometricians wish to achieve for their
tests; but in real life, independence of characteristics does not
exist (as noted by [7,16,26,39,43,44,46,55]). It is not even impor-
tant for developing taxonomies or diagnoses. Moreover,
self-report methods and independence of self-report scales are
probably not an issue, because the whole fields of psychiatry
and other areas of medicine also rely on patients self-reporting
their symptoms during clinical investigations. More important
is what people are asked to report and how their answers are
grouped, processed and interpreted. When questions related
to formal–dynamical features of behavioural regulation
(e.g. energetic, speed-related aspects and consistent emotional
dispositions) are mixed with questions related to social func-
tioning (e.g. their attitudes to rule obedience, morality), we
risk compromising the accuracy of investigations.
2. Statistical linear models are used as evidence of a structure
underlying nonlinear, contingent and feedback processes. FA,
mostly used by social scientists, suffers from multiple and
serious mathematical limitations, yet these are largely
ignored. FA is an easy-to-use statistical method that gives
the appearance of grouping variables scientifically into cat-
egories. Since its inception [56], it has faced much criticism
and has been pretty much ignored outside the social and be-
havioural sciences. For example, a recent text on statistical
methods in physics [57] accorded to it only 7 out of 412
pages, and then dismissed it. Serious limitations of FA
have been widely discussed throughout the past century
[46,53,55,58–66]. As pointed out by Sulis [39] in this
theme issue, FA and its derivative, Structural Equation
Modelling (SEM) are linear methods (so-called ‘nonlinear’
FA still uses matrices of linear correlations), whereas most
psychological processes show nonlinear relationships
among their components [67–73]. Linear methods cannot
even approximate the structure of nonlinear phenomena
because, by imposing linear structures, they present an
incorrect picture. As a relevant example, a linear correlation
of the curvilinear function described by the classic Yerkes–
Dodson [74] law with any linear ruler will wipe out the
nonlinear bell-shape curvature and subsequent additions
to this law (figure 2d ). Calculating such correlations would
show a statistically insignificant effect and therefore will be
missed in FA-derived models. The Yerkes–Dodson law,
however, relates to the main dimension in all taxonomic
models, i.e. arousal. How many other curvilinear effects may
have been missed in FA-derived models, we can only but
wonder. More sophisticated yet common types of nonlinearity,
such as bifurcations (figure 2b,c–d (-right) and saddle-points
(figure 2c-left), as well as contingent relations (figure 2e) have
also been described in research on arousal systems [24,67–69]
and various psychological phenomena associatedwith individ-
ual behavioural differences [70–72]. Subsequent investigations
uncovered a bifurcation in the Yerkes–Dodson curve [69] as
well: the curve collapsed for simple tasks but still remained in
subjectively complex tasks (figure 2d). This nonlinearity
cannot be captured by FA. The danger of redundancies in
statistically-basedapproaches isdiscussedbySulis [39],Rusalov
[45] and Uher [26].
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Figure 2. The progress of formal (mathematical) models in taxonomies: from linear orthogonal dimensions (a) to nonlinear models where functions ( y) have
multiple responses to the same argument (x) (b–d) to the models described from real neurophysiological data where mathematics is yet to be developed (e).
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attention is given to biases in the data. In FA, the key unit of
analysis is the degree of correlations between variables, and
FA-based ‘evidence’ does not reflect anything more than a
degree of these intercorrelations. Thismeans that FA can ident-
ify a large factor of strongly intercorrelated variables only
because the researcher has preferred specific types of variables.
In this sense, FA is insensitive to biases in the data and
in the choice of variables and so some researchers comparedFA efficiency to tarot cards [75, p. 144]. For example, the FFM
of personality adopted the factor structure of the Big Five
Model of social perception based on the lexical approach. It
is called lexical not because it used questionnaires but because
it used (arbitrarily chosen) thousands of common-language
descriptors of psychological differences, in which proximity
was analysed using FA. This method, however, has a strong
sociability bias by default [3,26–36,40,41,43,44,46]: after all,
language (and verbal descriptors) emerged in evolution to
Study 1
results:
main dimensions are:
F1 =
F2 =
F1 =
F2 =
F1 =
F2 =
r signif
r signif
r signif
r signif
Study 2 Study 3
Figure 3. Illustration of the sensitivity of FA to the choice of items. FA groups
items on the basis of their intercorrelations. If the lists include significant
portions of items related, for example, to socialization (rectangular blue bul-
lets) or negative emotions (triangular green bullets), their proportions and
close relationships will create large factors of Extraversion (blue) and Neur-
oticism (green) (hypothetical Study 1). Changing the lists, however, will
resolve in other main factors (Studies 2 and 3).
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to pro-social individual differences than to other types of
theme, and the prevalence of certain type of descriptors in
the list of variables results in a large factor related to socializa-
tion. Since this pro-social bias of language is universal, we can
expect that in lexical studies the factor of Extraversion will
always be one of the largest (figure 3). Moreover, a negativity
bias of emotionality and conflation of concepts in everyday
concepts and language also affects all resulting lexical
models, producing factors of Neuroticism and conflating mul-
tiple temperament constructs in one factor, as it happened for
the factorof Extraversion [3,46]. Some researchers using the Big
Five Model wisely suggested that the FFM might represent
dimensions of language-encoded social (peer) perception
amongpeople rather thanbiologically-based ‘humanuniversals’
[3,26,27,31–36,40,41,43,46,54].
4. Evidence of cross-cultural similarity of social phenomena is
taken as evidence related to biologically-based traits. Researchers
working with the FFM often claim to have identified ‘human
universals’ and biologically-based traits. They are especially
proud of the cross-cultural consistency of at least two FFM
dimensions, Extraversion and Neuroticism, as evidence sup-
porting their model. Cross-cultural comparisons of lexical
models are, however, irrelevant for explorations of biologi-
cally-based systems of individuality. After all, cross-cultural
studies measure commonalities between cultures, and not
biological systems. As noted above, it is natural to find consist-
ency of a sociability bias of language emerging as the
Extraversion factor, and a negativity bias of emotionality
emerging as the Neuroticism factor in cross-cultural FFM
studies because these biases affect verbal descriptors in all
cultures in a similar way [46]. Saucier [5], similar to the pos-
ition of Uher [36] and Trofimova [3,16,46], pointed out that
‘the lexical approach as formulated by Allport and Odbert,
seems to not lead directly to neurophysiological bases of
personality (sic)’. A socio-cultural and socio-linguistic frame-
work for classifying consistent individual differences might
not be capable of differentiating between biologically-based
individual differences in the detail needed, because the
social representation of individual differences is often blind
to features relevant to biology. Therefore, it is important tocontinue developing and using specific concepts related to
biologically-based differences (i.e. temperament, mental
disabilities and abilities).
5. Statistical versus conceptual evidence. Young social scien-
tists often place too much trust in statistical methods, hoping
these methods could derive, confirm or disprove taxonomical
models of biologically-based traits just by pushing buttons in
statistics software. However, FA and other statistical methods
often involve arbitrarily selected and subjectively defined
variables, while abandoning cases that do not fit well into
main trends. In contrast to this, taxonomies should include
all cases in all their aspects as Uher [26] elaborated in the
concepts of comprehensiveness and representativeness.
Moreover, conceptual analysis for the purpose of taxonomy
development always includes consideration of the natural
principles driving the differentiation between the typological
groups of these taxonomies, whereas statistics is blind to such
principles. Statistical methods in general are incapable of
identifying these underlying principles and cannot substitute
for multi-disciplinary analysis: they require researchers to
select and define variables prior to statistical processing
and cannot do the selection and definition for us.
For these reasons, other more mature sciences do not use
statistics to derive their taxonomies, as noted by Sulis [39],
although they have collected much more data over the centu-
ries than psychology. In older sciences, the development of
taxonomies of natural systems first required the development
of a detailed conceptual framework and a large body of obser-
vations from boundary disciplines differentiating the features
of the phenomena under study. Such conceptual differen-
tiation went hand-in-hand with cross-disciplinary
cooperation. For example, the standard model of elementary
particles was derived from knowledge in physics, mathemat-
ics, cosmology and chemistry; the periodic table of chemical
elements was based upon chemistry and was later explained
by quantum mechanics; biological taxonomies were derived
from findings and principles from reproductive biology,
ecology, biochemistry, anatomy and metabolic research; ana-
tomic classifications used principles of functionality, complex
fractal structure and ensemble-like dynamics of somatic
systems,. Even after centuries of investigations, many of these
taxonomies are still works in progress. In this issue, Uher [26]
has presented a categorization of methodological approaches
used indifferent fieldsto select andreducevariables for taxonomy
development, discussing advantages and limitations.4. Principles driving biologically-based traits:
interdependent, contingent and multi-level
compositions
This theme issue presents studies of individual differences
involving multiple methodologies: genetic analysis [48,52],
EEG [1,13], evoked potentials [1] and MRI correlates
[8,12,25], PET scans for receptor density [10], drug challenges
[7], behavioural tasks [1,7,12], combined with questionnaires
for parents assessing their children [12] or with self-reports of
adults [1,2,7,16,52], cross-cultural and inter-species compara-
tive studies [5,26], profiling clinical samples [3,8,15,39],
mathematical modelling and statistical analysis [11,52]. All of
these different approaches brought an unexpected and sober-
ing result: components-oriented approaches looking for
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regional brain activity, ‘amount’ of neurotransmitters) might
not work [45]. As Cloninger & Zwir [52] point out, ‘evolution
and development operate on adaptation of whole organisms
or persons, not on individual traits or categories.’
Several key principles for taxonomies are identified
by leading scientists in this issue. First, there is the matter
of interdependence between components contributing
to biologically-based traits, and this speaks against the
dimensionality approach presently common in differential
psychology. The dimensionality approach that maps psy-
chological types to quadrants within a small number of
independent linear dimensions appeared to be a step forward
from empirically-derived classifications (that use common be-
havioural observations). The first known dimensional model
was offered by Immanuel Kant in 1798 [76], who plotted Hip-
pocrates’ four temperaments into a space of two dimensions
(figure 2a). Kant’s two dimensions reappeared under different
names in practically all existing models of temperament and
personality offered in the twentieth century, including that
offered by Russell and Mehrabian in 1977 (see [3], for a
review). Interestingly, the resemblance between Kant’s model
or other models of temperament and the FFM’s two main
dimensions as well as the concept of temperament in general
have never been discussed by many FFM proponents. The
problem is that the dimensionality approach assumes indepen-
dence (orthogonality) among dimensions. This orthogonality
is mathematically very convenient as it allows plotting psycho-
logical types into quadrants and calculating the ‘coordinates’
and values related to specific types. However, it presents a
very distorted picture of reality. There is a well-documented
interdependence among components (dimensions) of the sys-
tems underlying psychological traits, as noted by Netter [7]
and Sulis [39] and analysed by Trofimova [16]. This interde-
pendence might underlie the results observed by Farde’s and
Netter’s research groups [7,10], as well as the phenomena of
emotional regulation as described by Blair [8] and Jones &
Sloan [9]. As seen in the work of Sallis et al. [48], this interde-
pendence between Kant’s two main dimensions of energetic
and emotional regulation is also found at the genetic level.
Second, as pointed out by Robbins [6], Netter [7], Blair [8],
Trofimova [16], Posner & Rothbart [12], Rusalov [1], Hasselmo
& Stern [11], neurophysiological systems that are thought to
contribute to biologically-based traits have multiple subsys-
tems, and each of these subsystems shows functional specificity
and mutual feedback (figure 2e). A similar complexity was
found for socio-cultural factors affecting individual differ-
ences (e.g. education, SES, cultural and national identity,
personal history). These socio-cultural factors appear not to
be independent of each other and also have complex coupling
with biological factors. Robbins [6] and Trofimova [16]
pointed not only to the multiplicity of neurochemical systems
of human diversity but also their complex and multi-layered
functionality, which can be tuned so as to allow multiple
aspects of situations to be addressed simultaneously, but not
as independent traits. Cloninger & Zwir [52] and Sallis et al.
[48] note the multiplicity principle in genotype analysis. Trofi-
mova [3,16] suggested using the concept of an Ensemble of
traits for taxonomies of biologically-based traits instead of a
model with independent dimensions, considering them as
functional regulatory aspects of behaviour. Ensemble-like
relationships are noted, among others, for sensory systems,
somatic systems, systems at the molecular level ofneurochemical regulation.Many of themhave specific identifi-
able structures, but they act in close coordination with each
other. Similar to the division of functionality between vision
and hearing or between respiratory and muscular systems in
the joint regulation of behavioural acts, it is reasonable to con-
sider the partitioning the properties of nervous systems in
accordance with several universal aspects of situations, such
as intensity, novelty, complexity, speed of change, safety,
emergency and presence of specific reinforcers [1,3,16,39]. It
is unlikely that these aspects would emerge as independent
dimensions in FA or other statistical models because these
methods cannot differentiate them due to the high degree of
entanglement between these systems.
Third, as pointed out by Kagan [25], Netter [7], Jones &
Sloan [9], Sulis [39], Trofimova [16] and Acevedo et al. [15],
the relationships between temperament and the environment
are very dynamic during an individual’s lifetime. Investi-
gations into the differential contribution of the physical
environment, such as physiological state of the mother, nutri-
tion and physical touch (Jones & Sloan [9]) and the social
environment, such as culture, perceived social support and
status, cannot bring informative measurements without
differentiating between neurochemically-based traits (tem-
perament) and traits integrated with social values,
appraisals and expectations (personality).
Fourth, there is more to the dynamical complexity of tem-
perament systems than merely its development over the
lifespan. Several authors described key dynamical features
within neurophysiological systems that could not be captured
by linear statistical methods: the importance of variability
and noise for the system’s stability [11], the constructive
and transient nature of processes [16,39,66–71,73] and the
differential response of receptors from different locations in
the brain contingent on current tasks [2,6,7,10]. Sulis [39]
points out that linear correlations and approximations
might be partially applicable when stability of the distri-
butions is assumed, but this assumption is not appropriate
for natural systems. Similarly, Trofimova [16,73] explores a
functional constructivist approach in psychology, emphasizing
the generational and transient nature of human behaviour.
This approach underlines that all behavioural acts are being
created anew based on internal capacities and environmental
demands, and therefore she suggests that our taxonomies
should include dynamic principles that are reflective of
these constructive processes. Trofimova’s FET model [3,16]
coincides with the principles of diagonal evolution [73] and
expands work of Luria and Rusalov [1]. She suggests a taxon-
omy of temperament traits based on four formal, universal
dynamical properties of human behaviour—emotional dispo-
sitions, energetic, orientational and dynamic (related to speed
of integration) aspects manifested in three neurophysiologi-
cally different systems of behavioural regulation (physical,
social–verbal and those related to frontal cortical regulation).
Several authors discuss alternative mathematical approa-
ches that would be more adequate for the measurement
or modelling of the processes contributing to biologically-
based traits than traditional statistical and measurement
tools:MendelianRandomization,which comparesdistributions
of effects rather than single effects [48], cluster analysis
based on non-negative matrix factorization as a novel data-
mining method [52], new mathematical languages, such as
process algebra, non-Kolmogorov probability and functional
constructivism [39,73] and variability-noise-based models [11].
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individual differences and mental disorders
Throughout the twentieth century, psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists called for establishing a common taxonomy
of both healthy and mentally ill people. The focus on tem-
perament in several contributions to this theme issue is
based on the premise of a common aetiology of temperament
and mental disorders (i.e. neurochemical systems of behav-
ioural regulation). Indeed, if a model of biologically-based
traits has been carefully structured so as to be capable of
responding to dynamical interrelationships between systems
of behavioural regulation in healthy people, then in the pres-
ence of mental disorders, which presumably alter these
relationships, these profiles should exhibit distinct patterns con-
sistent with Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental
Disorders (DSM/ICD) symptoms of such illness. Therefore,
such a taxonomy of healthy people should be testable by inves-
tigations of mental disorders if these disorders can be mapped
using the descriptors of the same taxonomy [45].
In the latest DSM5 and ICD versions, the main classifi-
cations of mental disorders are heavily influenced by a
dimensional model of Negative and Positive Affect.
Meanwhile, a systemic model or classification of mental dis-
orders should comprise not only emotionality (affect)-related
but also non-emotionality-related components reflecting the
main functional aspects of behavioural regulation. Indeed,
many authors have investigated those aspects that are not
related to emotionality but nevertheless may represent at
their extremes symptoms of mental illness: impulsivity and
compulsivity (i.e. dynamics of integration of behavioural
acts [2,6,10,25]); schizophrenia [10,15]; Autistic and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorders [15] (associated with dysfunction
in cognitive processing); and psychopathy (as non-empathic
behavioural orientation) [8]. One approach to classify systems
of behavioural regulation is in terms of the functional aspects
of behavioural tasks as described by Rusalov [1], Sulis [39]
and Trofimova [16]. Mapping these regulatory systems to a
small set of functional features of activities opens up the
possibility of a more compact and formal presentation of
symptoms of mental disorders that emerge as deficiencies
within the neurophysiological systems regulating human
behaviour. Emotionality-related traits, however, should also
continue to be present at the core of investigations of healthy
and clinical samples. Couplings between opioid receptor sys-
tems (linked to dispositional emotionality) and monoamine
or neuropeptide systems (linked to the regulation of both
emotional and non-emotional aspects of behaviour) [16] as
well as couplings between hormonal and monoamine
systems [7] suggest that emotionality and other aspects of
behavioural regulation cannot simply be represented as inde-
pendent dimensions. The integration of these systems appears
to have a logical functional pattern, which is in favour of
functional ecology-based, and not a dimensional approach
to taxonomies.
In summary, despite intense efforts over several millennia,
the task of classifying biologically-based traits and their
deviations as mental illnesses continues to be incomplete
and challenging. The more knowledge that human-kind
has gained, the more challenging this task appears to be, and
during the twentieth century, the lists of neuroanatomical and
neurochemical systems contributing to biologically-based be-
havioural traits grew into the hundreds. We are still very farfrom declaring ‘mission accomplished’ in the classification of
these traits, contrary to claims of FFM proponents.
What becomes clear is that taxonomies of these traits cannot
be derived on the basis of findings from just one science.
Commonplace statistical and other mathematical methods,
including nonlinear dynamics, are still rather weak, failing to
capture the complexity of the processes that regulate human be-
haviour. The features of the systems underlying natural
phenomenaare complex and lie always at the cross-roads ofmul-
tiple disciplines [45]. Therefore,models that relyondata from just
one method or one discipline might be not very informative but
datasets from diverse disciplines or methods often have incom-
patible variance for joint statistical processing. For this reason
they should be a subject of analytic discussions to help identify
principles for developing taxonomies in the future. However,
as always, there is a language barrier (in this case—a multi-
disciplinary one). Many branches of psychology, psychiatry,
neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, animal biology, endocrinology,
philosophy and social sciences approached these matters from
their discipline-specific perspectives, and this theme issue is an
attempt to represent this diversity of opinions.
For us as editors, it was challenging to group these contri-
butions into chapters because many contributors reflected on
several important aspects of consistent individual differences.
It was also a delight to discuss these challenging scientific mat-
ters with some of the most prominent scientists in the field and
to enjoy their competence, intelligence, great sense of work dis-
cipline and kind cooperation. We want to especially praise the
efforts ofNancy Jones andAliza Sloan,who continuedworking
on their impressive paper while under attack from hurricane
Irma in Florida. At almost the same time, Robert Cloninger,
author of one of the earliest neurotransmitter hypotheses of
temperament traits, had to handle the consequences of the
floods in Texas after hurricane Harvey.We alsowant to congra-
tulate Petra Netter, a pioneer in research into the role of
neurotransmitters in temperament, with her 80th jubilee! Her
contribution is a great way to celebrate it, especially as she
had to spend a good part of this special year working on it.
We are deeply grateful for very helpful interactions
with our Editor at PTRS-B, Helen Eaton, who responded
to all of our small and big requests with great care. We hope
that after reading this theme issue, scientists from many disci-
plines will appreciate the complexity of the task of classifying
biologically-based individual differences in human behaviour
regulation, and will join us in future investigations.Data accessibility. This article has no additional data.
Authors’ contributions. All Editors worked diligently on this Editorial.
Competing interests. We have no competing interests.
Funding. T.W.R.’s research is supported by a Wellcome Trust Senior
Investigator Award 104631/Z/14/Z. J.U.’s research was supported
by a Marie Curie Fellowship from the European Commission
(Grant number 629430).Endnote
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between these two concepts, leaving it for us as Editors to comment
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